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In this paper, a brief account of the ﬁeld of runtime veriﬁcation is given. Starting with a
deﬁnition of runtime veriﬁcation, a comparison to well-known veriﬁcation techniques like
model checking and testing is provided, and applications in which runtime veriﬁcation
brings out its distinguishing features are pointed out. Moreover, extensions of runtime
veriﬁcation such asmonitor-oriented programming, andmonitor-based runtime reﬂection
are sketched and their similarities and differences are discussed. Finally, the use of runtime
veriﬁcation for contract enforcement is brieﬂy pointed out.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Software and software systems are increasingly ubiquitous in everyday life. Besides traditional applications such as
word processors or spreadsheets running onworkstations, software is an important part of consumer devices such asmobile
phones or digital cameras, and functions as embedded control devices in cars or in power plants. Especially in such embedded
application domains, is essential to guarantee that the deployed software works in a correct, secure, and reliable manner, as
life may depend on it. For example, the software within a car’s anti-skid system must speed with exactly the right velocity
to stabilize the car. Moreover, for a power plant it is important that no intruder gets control over the plant and that it works
also in case of a partial break-down of some of its parts.
Software engineering has been driven as a ﬁeld by the struggle for guaranteed quality properties ever since, but nowadays
and especially in the embedded domain, legislation and certiﬁcation authorities are requiring proof of the most critical
software properties in terms of a documented veriﬁcation process.
In recent years, the idea of software as services has added a newparadigm to the architecture of software systems: They are
seenmore andmore as autonomous agents acting according to certain contracts. For such systems, veriﬁcation is particularly
challenging as the overall behavior of such systems depends heavily on the involved agents, which renders the analysis of
such systems prior to execution next to impossible. One important aspect of veriﬁcation is then to check whether each party
acts according to the contract they have agreed on.
Traditionally, one considers three main veriﬁcation techniques: theorem proving [12], model checking [20], and testing
[49,16]. Theorem proving, which is mostly applied manually, allows to show correctness of programs similarly as a proof
in mathematics shows correctness of a theorem. Model checking, which is an automatic veriﬁcation technique, is mainly
applicable to ﬁnite-state systems. Testing covers a wide ﬁeld of diverse, often ad hoc, and incomplete methods for showing
correctness, or, more precisely, for ﬁnding bugs.
These techniques are subject to a number of forces imposed by the software to build and the development
process followed, and provide different trade-offs between them. For example, some require a formal model, like model
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checking, give stronger or weaker conﬁdence, like theorem proving over testing, or are graceful in case of error han-
dling.
Runtime veriﬁcation is being pursued as a lightweight veriﬁcation technique complementing veriﬁcation techniques such
as model checking and testing and establishes another trade-off point between these forces. One of the main distinguishing
features of runtime veriﬁcation is due to its nature of being performed at runtime, which opens up the possibility to act
whenever incorrect behavior of a software system is detected.
The aim of this paper is to give a brief account of runtime veriﬁcation. Therefore, we ﬁrst highlight basic ideas of runtime
veriﬁcation and discuss distinguishing features in comparison to other veriﬁcation techniques. Then, in Section 3, we discuss
runtime veriﬁcation in the context of correctness properties speciﬁed in linear temporal logic. Some extensionsworkingwith
more restricted or more expressive speciﬁcation languages are summarized in Section 4. In Section 5, we sketch approaches
which do not only monitor but also intervene in the system under scrutiny. Runtime veriﬁcation for contracts is discussed
in Section 6. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 7.
2. Runtime veriﬁcation
In this paper, we follow [25] and deﬁne a software failure as a deviation between the observed behavior and the required
behavior of the software system. A fault is deﬁned as the deviation between the current behavior and the expected behavior,
which is typically identiﬁed by a deviation of the current and the expected state of the system. A fault might lead to a failure,
but not necessarily. An error, on the other hand, is a mistake made by a human that results in a fault and possibly in a failure.
According to IEEE [1], veriﬁcation comprises all techniques suitable for showing that a system satisﬁes its speciﬁcation.
Traditional veriﬁcation techniques comprise theoremproving [12], model checking [20], and testing [49,16]. A relatively new
direction of veriﬁcation is runtime veriﬁcation,1 whichmanifested itself within the previous years as a lightweight veriﬁcation
technique:
Deﬁnition (Runtime veriﬁcation). Runtime veriﬁcation is the discipline of computer science that deals with the study, de-
velopment, and application of those veriﬁcation techniques that allow checking whether a run of a system under scrutiny
satisﬁes or violates a given correctness property.
Runtime veriﬁcation itself deals (only) with the detection of violations (or satisfactions) of correctness properties. Thus,
whenever a violation has been observed, it typically does not inﬂuence or change the program’s execution, say for trying to
repair the observed violation. However, runtime veriﬁcation is the basis for concepts also dealing with observed problems,
as we discuss in Section 5.
2.1. Monitors
In this paper, a run of a system is understood as a possibly inﬁnite sequence of the system’s states, which are formed
by current variable assignments, or as the sequence of actions a system is emitting or performing. Formally, a run may be
considered as a possible inﬁnite word or trace. An execution of a system is a ﬁnite preﬁx of a run and, formally, it is a ﬁnite
trace. When running a program, we can only observe executions, which, however, restrict the corresponding evolving run
as being their preﬁx. While, in veriﬁcation, we are interested in the question whether a run, and more generally, all runs of
a system adhere to given correctness properties, executions are the primary object analyzed in the setting of RV.
Checkingwhether an executionmeets a correctness property is typically performedusing amonitor. In its simplest form, a
monitor decideswhether the current execution satisﬁes a given correctness property by outputting either yes/true or no/false.
Formally, when [[ϕ]] denotes the set of valid executions given by property ϕ, runtime veriﬁcation boils down to checking
whether the execution w is an element of [[ϕ]]. Thus, in its mathematical essence, runtime veriﬁcation answers the word
problem, i.e. the problem whether a given word is included in some language. Note that often, the word problem can be
decidedwith lower complexity compared to, for example, the subset problem: Language containment for non-deterministic
ﬁnite-automata is PSPACE-complete [58] (which is essential for model checking, see Section 2.2), while deciding whether a
given word is accepted by a non-deterministic automaton is NLOGSPACE-complete [41].
However, to cover richer approaches to RV, we deﬁne the notion of monitors in a slightly more general form:
Deﬁnition (Monitor). Amonitor is a device that reads a ﬁnite trace and yields a certain verdict.
Here, a verdict is typically a truth value from some truth domain. A truth domain is a lattice with a unique top element true
and a unique bottom element false. This deﬁnition covers the standard two-valued truth domain B = {true, false} but also
ﬁts for monitors yielding a probability in [0, 1] with which a given correctness property is satisﬁed. Sometimes, one might
be even more liberal and consider also verdicts that are not elements of a truth domain, though we do not follow this view
in this paper.
1 http://www.runtime-veriﬁcation.org.
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A monitor may on one hand be used to check the current execution of a system. In this setting, which is termed online
monitoring, the monitor should be designed to consider executions in an incremental fashion and in an efﬁcient manner. On
the other hand, a monitor may work on a (ﬁnite set of) recorded execution(s), in which case we speak of ofﬂine monitoring.
For amonitor to be ideally suited for runtime veriﬁcation, it should adhere to the twomaxims impartiality and anticipation.
Impartiality requires that a ﬁnite trace is not evaluated to trueor, respectively false, if there still exists an (inﬁnite) continuation
leading to another verdict. Anticipation requires that once every (inﬁnite) continuation of a ﬁnite trace leads to the same
verdict, then the ﬁnite trace evaluates to this very same verdict. Intuitively, the ﬁrst maxim postulates that a monitor only
decides for false—meaning that a misbehavior has been observed—or true—meaning that the current behavior fulﬁlls the
correctness property, regardless of how it continues—only if this is indeed the case. Clearly, this maxim requires to have at
least three different truth values: true, false, and inconclusive, but of course more than three truth values might give a more
precise assessment of correctness. The second maxim requires a monitor to indeed report true or false, if the correctness
property is indeed violated or satisﬁed. In simplewords, impartiality and anticipation, guarantee that the semantics is neither
premature nor overcautious in its evaluations. See [11,9] for a more elaborate discussion of these issues in the context of
linear temporal logic.
In runtime veriﬁcation, monitors are typically generated automatically from some high-level speciﬁcation. As runtime
veriﬁcation has its roots inmodel checking, often some variant of linear temporal logic, such as LTL [51], is employed. But also
formalisms inspired by the linear μ-calculus have been introduced, for example in [24], which explains an accompanying
monitoring framework . Actually, one of the key problems addressed in runtime veriﬁcation is the generation of monitors
from high-level speciﬁcations, and we discuss this issue for LTL in more detail in Section 3.
2.2. Runtime veriﬁcation versus model checking
In essence, model checking describes the problem of determining whether, given a model M and a correctness property
ϕ, all computations of M satisfy ϕ. Model checking [20], which is an automatic veriﬁcation technique, is mainly applicable
to ﬁnite-state systems, for which all computations can exhaustively be enumerated.
In the automata theoretic approach to model checking [65], a correctness property ϕ is transformed to an automaton
M¬ϕ accepting all runs violating ϕ. This automaton is put in parallel to a model M to check whether M has a run violating
ϕ.
Runtime veriﬁcation has its origins inmodel checking, and, to a certain extend, the key problem of generatingmonitors is
similar to the generation of automata in model checking. However, there are also important differences to model checking:
• While in model checking, all executions of a given system are examined to answer whether they satisfy a given
correctness property ϕ, which corresponds to the language inclusion problem, runtime veriﬁcation deals with the
word problem.
• While model checking typically considers inﬁnite traces, runtime veriﬁcation deals with ﬁnite executions—as execu-
tions have necessarily to be ﬁnite.
• While in model checking a complete model is given allowing to consider arbitrary positions of a trace, runtime
veriﬁcation, especially when dealing with online monitoring, considers ﬁnite executions of increasing size. For this, a
monitor should be designed to consider executions in an incremental fashion.
These differences make it necessary to adapt the concepts developed in model checking to be applicable in runtime
veriﬁcation. For example, while checking a property in model checking using a kind of backwards search in the model is
sometimes a good choice, it should be avoided in online monitoring as this would require, in the worst case, the whole
execution trace to be stored for evaluation.
From an application point of view, there are also important differences betweenmodel checking and runtime veriﬁcation.
Runtime veriﬁcation deals onlywith observed executions as they are generated by the real system. Thus runtime veriﬁca-
tion is applicable toblackbox systems forwhichnosystemmodel is athand. Inmodel checking,however, a suitablemodelof the
system to be checkedmust be constructed as—before actually running the system—all possible executions must be checked.
If such a precise model of the underlying system is given, and, if moreover a bound on the size of its state space is known,
powerful, so-called bounded model-checking techniques can be applied [13] for analyzing the system. The crucial idea, which
is equally used in conformance testing [66,19], is that for every ﬁnite-state system, an inﬁnite trace must reach at least one
state twice. Thus, if a ﬁnite trace reaches a state a second time, the trace can be extended to an inﬁnite trace by taking the
corresponding loop inﬁnitely often. Likewise, considering all ﬁnite traces of length up-to the state-place plus one, one has
information on all possible loops of the underlying system, without actually working on the system’s state space directly.
Clearly, similar correspondences would be helpful in runtime veriﬁcation as well. However, in runtime veriﬁcation, an
upper bound on the system’s state space if typically not known.More importantly, the states of an observed execution usually
do not reﬂect the system’s state completely but do only contain the value of certain variables of interest. Thus, seeing a state
twice in an observed execution does not allow to infer that the observed loop can be taken ad inﬁnitum.
Furthermore, model checking suffers from the so-called state explosion problem, which terms the fact that analyzing all
executions of a system is typically been carried out by generating the whole state space of the underlying system, which is
often huge. Considering a single run, on the other hand, does usually not yield any memory problems, provided that when
monitoring online only a ﬁnite history of the execution has to be stored.
296 M. Leucker, C. Schallhart / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 293–303
Last but not least, in online monitoring, the complexity for generating the monitor is typically negligible, as the monitor
is often only generated once. However, the complexity of the monitor, i.e. its memory and computation time requirements
for checking an execution are of important interest, as the monitor is part of the running system and should inﬂuence the
system as less as possible.
2.3. Runtime veriﬁcation versus testing
As runtime veriﬁcation does not consider each possible execution of a system, but just a single or a ﬁnite subset, it shares
similarities with testing, which terms a variety of usually incomplete veriﬁcation techniques.
Typically, in testing one considers a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite input–output sequences forming a test suite [53]. Test-case execution
is then checkingwhether the output of a system agreeswith the predicted one,when giving the input sequence to the system
under test.
A different form of testing, however, is closer to runtime veriﬁcation, which is sometimes termed oracle-based testing.
Here, a test-suite is only formed by input-sequences. Tomake sure that the output of the system is as anticipated, a so-called
test oraclehas to bedesigned and “attached” to the systemunder test. Thus, in essence, runtimeveriﬁcation canbeunderstood
as this form of testing. There are, however, differences in the foci of runtime veriﬁcation and oracle-based testing:
• In testing, an oracle is typically deﬁned directly, rather than generated from some high-level speciﬁcation.
• On the other hand, providing a suitable set of input sequences to “exhaustively” test a system, is rarely considered in
the domain of runtime veriﬁcation.
Thus, runtime veriﬁcation can also considered as a form of passive testing.
When monitors are equipped in the ﬁnal software system, one may also understand runtime veriﬁcation as “testing
forever”, which makes it, in a certain sense, complete.
2.4. When to use runtime veriﬁcation?
Let us conclude the description of runtime veriﬁcation by listing certain application domains, highlighting the distin-
guishing features of runtime veriﬁcation:
• The veriﬁcation verdict, as obtained by model checking or theorem proving, is often referring to a model of the real
system under analysis, since applying these techniques directly to the real implementation would be intractable.
The model typically reﬂects most important aspects of the corresponding implementation, and checking the model
for correctness gives useful insights to the implementation. Nevertheless, the implementation might behave slightly
different than predicted by the model. Runtime veriﬁcation may then be used to easily check the actual execution of
the system, to make sure that the implementation really meets its correctness properties. Thus, runtime veriﬁcation
may act as a partner to theorem proving and model checking.
• Often, some information is available only at runtime or is conveniently checked at runtime. For example, whenever
library code with no accompanying source code is part of the system to build, only a vague description of the behavior
of the code might be available. In such cases, runtime veriﬁcation is an alternative to theorem proving and model
checking.
• The behavior of an application may depend heavily on the environment of the target system, but a precise description
of this environment might not exist. Then it is not possible to obtain the information necessary to test the system
in an adequate manner. Moreover, formal correctness proofs by model checking or theorem proving may only be
achievable by taking certain assumptions on the behavior of the environment—which should be checked at runtime.
In this scenario, runtime veriﬁcation outperforms classical testing and adds on formal correctness proofs by model
checking and theorem proving.
• In the case of systems where security is important or in the case of safety-critical systems, it is useful also to monitor
behavior or properties that have been statically proved or tested, mainly to have a double check that everything goes
well: Here, runtime veriﬁcation acts as a partner of theorem proving, model checking, and testing.
The above mentioned items can be found in a combined manner especially in highly dynamic systems such as adaptive,
self-organizing, or self-healing systems (see [39] for an overviewon such approaches towards self-management). The behavior
of such systemsdependsheavily on the environment and changes over time,whichmakes their behavior hard to predict—and
hard to analyze prior to execution. To assure certain correctness properties of especially such systems, we expect runtime
veriﬁcation tobecomeamajorveriﬁcation technique.More speciﬁcally,weanticipatea runtimeveriﬁcationbasedcomponent
to be part of the architecture of such dynamic systems, as explained in more detail in Section 5.
3. Runtime veriﬁcation of linear temporal logic speciﬁcations
In runtime veriﬁcation, which is heavily inspired by model checking, a correctness property ϕ is automatically translated
into a monitor. Correctness properties specify the form of individual executions of a system and are usually formulated in
some variant of linear temporal logic, such as LTL [51], as seen for example in [35,32,31,37,38,60]. In this section, we recall
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the ideas of LTL3 as one example of a linear-time temporal logic specially designed for runtime veriﬁcation. For a technical
presentation, see [10,8].
As especially in the model checking community, Pnueli’s LTL [51] is a well-accepted linear-time temporal logic used for
specifying properties of inﬁnite traces one usually wants to check the very same properties in runtime veriﬁcation as well.
However, one has to interpret their semantics with respect to ﬁnite preﬁxes as they arise in observing actual systems. This
approach to runtime veriﬁcation is summarized in the following rationale:
Pnueli’s LTL is a well-accepted linear-time temporal logic used for specifying properties of inﬁnite traces. In runtime
veriﬁcation, our goal is to check LTL properties given ﬁnite preﬁxes of inﬁnite traces.
Therefore, LTL3’s syntax coincides with LTL, while its semantics is given for ﬁnite traces.
To implement the idea that, for a given LTL3 formula, its meaning for a preﬁx of an inﬁnite trace should correspond to
its meaning considered as an LTL formula for the full inﬁnite trace, we use three truth values: true, false, and inconclusive,
denoted respectively by , ⊥, and ?. More precisely, given a ﬁnite word u and an LTL3 formula ϕ, the semantics is deﬁned as
follows:
• if there is no continuation of u satisfying ϕ (considered as an LTL formula), the value of ϕ is false;
• if every continuation of u satisﬁes ϕ (considered as an LTL formula), it is true;
• otherwise, the value is inconclusive since the observations so far are inconclusive, and neither true or false can be
determined.
While there are actually semantics for LTL on ﬁnite traces [42,47,29], these use (only) two truth values. We strongly believe
that only two truth values lead to misleading results in runtime veriﬁcation: As a ﬁrst example, consider a property G¬p,
stating that no state satisfying p should occur. Clearly, when p is observed, the corresponding monitor should complain.
However, as long as p does not hold, it is misleading to say that the formula is true, since the next observation might already
violate the formula. On the other hand, the formula Fp, stating that eventually a p is observed, is fulﬁlled (only) when a ﬁrst
p is observed. As a second example, consider the formula ¬pUinit (read: not p until init) stating that nothing bad (p) should
happen before the init function is called. If within an execution p becomes true before init, the formula is violated and thus
false (for any continuation of the current execution). If, on the other hand, the init function has been called and no p has been
observed before, the formula is true, regardless of what will happen in the future. Besides observing faults, for testing and
veriﬁcation, it is equally important to knowwhether some property is indeed true or whether the current observation is just
inconclusive and a violation of the property to check may still occur.
Originally, we proposed this three-valued semantics and its use for runtime veriﬁcation in [8]. However, some essential
concepts were deﬁned by Kupferman and Vardi: In [43], a bad preﬁx (of a Büchi automaton) is deﬁned as a ﬁnite preﬁx
which cannot be the preﬁx of any accepting trace. Dually, a good preﬁx is a ﬁnite preﬁx such that any inﬁnite continuation of
the trace will be accepted. It is exactly this classiﬁcation that forms the basis of our 3-valued semantics: “bad preﬁxes” (of
formulae) are mapped to false, “good preﬁxes” evaluate to true, while the remaining preﬁxes yield inconclusive.
For a given LTL3 formula, we describe in [8] how to construct a (deterministic) ﬁnite state machine (FSM) with three
output symbols. This automaton reads ﬁnite traces and yields their three-valued semantics. Thus, monitors for three-valued
formulae classify preﬁxes as one of good = , bad = ⊥, or ? (neither good nor bad). Standard minimization techniques for
FSMs can be applied to obtain a unique FSM that is optimal with respect to its number of states. In other words, any smaller
FSM must be non-deterministic or check a different property. As an FSM can straightforwardly be deployed, we obtain a
practical framework for runtime veriﬁcation.
The proposed semantics of LTL3 has a valuable implication for a correspondingmonitor. It requires themonitor to report a
violation of a given property as early as possible: Since any continuation of a bad (good) preﬁx is bad (respectively good), there
exists aminimal bad (good) preﬁx for every bad (good) preﬁx. In runtime veriﬁcation, we are interested in getting feedback
from the monitor as early as possible, i.e., for minimal preﬁxes, let them be either good or bad. Since all bad preﬁxes for a
formula ϕ yield false and good preﬁxes yield true, also minimal ones do so. Thus, the correctness of our monitor procedure
ensures that already for minimal good or bad preﬁxes either true or false is obtained. In other words, the corresponding
monitor fulﬁlls both maxims impartiality and anticipation.
In [23], a Büchi automaton was modiﬁed to serve as a monitor reporting false for minimal bad preﬁxes. However, no
precise semantics in terms of LTL of the resulting monitor was given. As such, LTL3 can be understood as a logic which
complements the constructions carried out in [23] with a formal framework.
It is natural to ask which LTL properties aremonitorable at all. Pnueli and Zaks [52] deﬁne a property as monitorable with
respect to a tracewhenever a correspondingmonitormight still report a violation (or satisfaction). In [10], it has been shown
that the popular belief thatmonitoring is only suitable for safety properties ismisleading: The class ofmonitorable properties
is richer than the union of safety and co-safety properties. For example, the property ϕ ≡ ((p ∨ q)Ur) ∨ Gp is monitorable
while it is neither safe or co-safe: ppp . . . satisﬁes ϕ but none of its preﬁxes u is good—and therefore ϕ is not safe. Analogously,
qqq . . . violates ϕ but none of its preﬁxes is bad, and hence ϕ is not co-safe as well. But on the other hand, one can show that
every preﬁx is continuable to either satisfaction or violation of ϕ.
However, there remain many properties which are non-monitorable: Consider for example the request/acknowledge
property G(r → Fa) which states that every request is ﬁnally acknowledged: any pending request might be acknowledged in
the next observation, so a ﬁnite trace is never sufﬁcient to prove a violation. Moreover, any ﬁnite trace might be continued
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with a new request that will never be granted, so that the formula cannot be evaluated to true either for any ﬁnite trace. Since
such properties arise often in practice, a solution which evaluates such a property irrespectively to the inconclusive verdict
is quite ugly—raising the question of whether it is possible to reﬁne the inconclusive verdict into a more telling verdict.
In [9,11], we introduce a four-valued semantics for LTL which reﬁnes the inconclusive verdict into a presumably true and
presumably false truth value, and call the resulting logic runtime veriﬁcation linear temporal logic (RV-LTL). In other words,
RV-LTL’s semantics indicates whether a ﬁnite trace describes a system behavior which either (1) satisﬁes the monitored
property, (2) violates the property, (3) will presumably violate the property, or (4) will presumably conform to the property
in the future, once the system has stabilized. Using these truth values, we resolved the ugly situation of facing an invariably
inconclusive verdict in verifying a system at runtime: As long as the ﬁnal verdict depends on future events, an RV-LTL-based
monitor displays a presumably true valuation—if no unanswered request is pending—and presumably false otherwise.
Instead of using good/bad-preﬁxes as the basis for runtime veriﬁcation, one could rely on Kupferman’s and Vardi’s notion
of informative preﬁxes [43]. Intuitively, a preﬁx is informative if it “explains” whether a formula holds or not. Consider for
example the formula XXX(p ∧ ¬p), saying that after three letters, p should and should not hold. Clearly, the formula is not
satisﬁable and every ﬁnite trace is a bad preﬁx. Nevertheless, only a trace of four letters is considered informative, as each of
the ﬁrst three letters defers checking the remaining subformula on the remaining string, and it is only with the fourth letter
to check whether it satisﬁes p ∧ ¬p, which is then appearently not true.
Especially (formula) rewriting-based and alternating automata-based approaches for checking correctness properties at
runtime follow a semantics which is based on informative preﬁxes, as for example the approaches shown in [36,30,59]. For
these works, however, the maxim of anticipation is not fulﬁlled, since sometimes a violation of a property is reported “too
late”, as shown in the example. See [10] for a more elaborate discussion on this topic.
4. Runtime veriﬁcation with different levels of expressiveness
In the previous section, we have considered monitors for LTL speciﬁcations. LTL is particularly useful when specifying
restricted regular properties of discrete time systems. However, many interesting properties to be monitored at runtime are
not expressible in LTL. On the other hand, we learned that request/acknowledge properties are not monitorable in the sense
of [52], even though they are expressible in LTL. In this section, we brieﬂy describe extensions, restrictions, and alternatives
to the use of LTL in runtime veriﬁcation. Note that we only list a few logic-based runtime veriﬁcation approaches. For a more
comprehensive list of fault-monitoring tools see [25].
Often, runtime veriﬁcation is only considered for safety properties, as for example in [37]. In simple words, an inﬁnite
word violates a safety property [57] if and only if a ﬁnite preﬁx violates the property. Thus, safety properties aremonitorable.
In other words, restricting a logical formalism to its safety fragment, avoids to deal with the issue of (non-)monitorability.
Similarly, restricting to only past operators in linear temporal logics avoids semantic issues with respect to the unknown
future of a trace.
A typicalproperty tocheckat runtime is thateveryﬁle thatwasopened iseventually closed.Astraightforwardspeciﬁcation
inLTLwouldbeG(open → Fclose). However,whenopeningandclosingdifferentﬁles, onehas tomake sure that corresponding
ﬁles are opened and closed. Thus, a more appropriate speciﬁcation would be
∧
x∈N G(open(x) → Fclose(x)) where x ranges
over arbitrary ﬁle identiﬁers. An approach for monitoring LTL enriched with such parameterized propositions is carried out
in [59] within the J-LO project.
Non-regular properties are not expressible in LTL. Thus, expressing a proper nesting of operators like calls and returns
cannot be expressed in LTL. In [56], synthesizing monitors for safety properties is described for a logic, that considers nested
calls and returns.
LOLA [24] is a monitor generation framework based on the linear μ-calculus with future and past modalities, and with a
notion of parallel streams of output. It is well suited for synchronous systems such as digital circuits.
In [28], three-valued, anticipatorymonitor synthesis procedures for various linear-time temporal logicshavebeendeﬁned,
including an LTL version allowing to formulate properties of integer constraints [26].
In practice, often also the exact timing of events has to be checked. So far, however, not many approaches for runtime
veriﬁcation of real-time properties have been introduced. In [34], monitor synthesis based on LTL enriched with a quantiﬁer
allowing to freeze the actual time to a variable which may be later on referred to is studied. In [61,14], fault diagnosis for
timed systems is examined, a problem that shares some similarities with runtime veriﬁcation yet is more complicated.
In [8,10],we have extended the three-valued approach also tomonitoring of real-timeproperties speciﬁed in the temporal
logic TLTL [55]. Thus, a three-valued semantics for TLTL is deﬁned yielding one of true, false, or inconclusive for a ﬁnite timed
trace, i.e., a trace of events enriched with time stamps denoting their time of occurrence. The procedure follows the scheme
for LTL3, yet uses a region automaton-based analysis known from model checking timed automata [5] to decide the verdict
in an anticipatory manner. Note that in contrast to the timed LTL version proposed in [34], TLTL also allows the formulation
of formulas predicting the time of the occurence of an event.
Monitor synthesis for the the logic metric interval temporal logic (MITL), which is another popular temporal logic for
specifying realtime properties, is studied in [46]. MITL and TLTL both allow to reason on a ﬁnite set of properties. In [45,50]
monitoring of continuous signals is considered, which is intrinsically different to observing discrete signals in a continuous
time domain.
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The Eagle temporal logic [6] is a basic, yet, very general speciﬁcation language suitable for monitoring correctness
properties. It is based on recursive rules over three temporal connectives: next, previous, and concatenation. It allows to
encode several other logical languages, for example future time temporal logic, past-time logic, extended regular expressions,
μ-calculus, or state machines. It allows data-bindings, which caters for checking also real-time properties or for collecting
statistics of the observed traces.
Another recent example to strike the right balance between the expressiveness of the employed speciﬁcation formalism
and its capabilities is presented in [21]: LARVA is a tool which generates monitors for speciﬁcations formulated in terms
of dynamic and communicating automata employing events and timers—and is therefore able to handle timing as well as
contextual information.
A serious difﬁculty for monitoring systems that is especially apparent when considering real time and hybrid systems is
that the execution of the monitor on the same platform on which the system is executed might inﬂuence the overall system
behaviour. Thus, a systemwith implantedmonitors could satisfy different correctness properties than the systemwithout its
monitors. In such cases, the only simple way out is to use dedicated monitoring hardware not affecting the observed system
[64,62,63].
5. Beyond runtime veriﬁcation
One of the distinguishing features of runtime veriﬁcation compared to other veriﬁcation techniques is due to the fact
that veriﬁcation, at least in online monitoring, is performed while executing a program. This offers the possibility to react
to violations of correctness properties. More speciﬁcally, we runtime veriﬁcation allows to react on faults, before they turn
into failures. This allows applications of runtime veriﬁcation techniques, in which other veriﬁcation techniques cannot help.
5.1. Applications
In huge systems, certain (hardware) components may fail now and then. Using monitors to check the expected behavior,
such a fault may be observed and reported. Additional code for mitigation may then react to the fault, for example, by
displaying a corresponding error message. In a certain sense, this is similar to the well-known concept of exception handling
in programming languages, however, here, exceptions are deﬁned by violations to correctness properties.
However, not only reliability issuesmaybeneﬁt from runtimeveriﬁcation techniques. In some cases it is easy to specify the
prohibited behavior whereas it is complicated to specify and verify the allowed behavior—corresponding to the multiplied
negation of all proscriptions. Then, it might be even impractical to implement all these rules, whereas a go-ahead-check-and-
repair strategy might be an easy and effective solution to the problem. For example, one might develop a web server ﬁrst as
an application answering each (atomic) request in the expectedmanner. Tomake sure that the server indeed follows a certain
protocol, for example, that a user only receives a document from some database after being logged in, may be enforced by
monitors and corresponding mitigation code: If the user has not logged in when trying to receive a document (which can
easily be checked by a monitor), the mitigation code will display a login screen.
5.2. Approaches to react at runtime
The idea ofmonitoring a systemand reacting has appeared in differentmanifestations in computer science. In this section,
we brieﬂy introduce three such approaches: First,we describe fault detection, identiﬁcation, and recovery (FDIR), as an example
for a traditional methodological framework. Then we introduce runtime reﬂection (RR) and monitor-oriented programming
(MOP) as current and runtime veriﬁcation based approaches.
5.2.1. FDIR
The ideas outlined above, are to a certain extent covered by the popular notion of FDIR, which stands for Fault Detection,
Identiﬁcation, and Recovery or sometimes for Fault Diagnosis, Isolation, and Recovery or various combinations thereof [22].
The general idea of FDIR is that a failure within a system shows up by a fault. A fault, however, does typically not identify the
failure: for example, there might be different reasonswhy amonitored client does not follow a certain protocol, one of them,
e.g., that it uses an old version of a protocol. If this is identiﬁed as the failure, reconﬁguration may switch the server to work
with the old version of the protocol.
Crow and Rushby instantiated the scheme FDIR using Reiter’s theory of diagnosis from ﬁrst principles in [22]. Especially,
the detection of errors is carried out using diagnosis techniques. In runtime reﬂection [7], runtime veriﬁcation is proposed as
a tool for fault detection, while a simpliﬁed version of Reiter’s diagnosis is suggested for identiﬁcation.
5.2.2. Runtime reﬂection
Monitor-based runtime reﬂection or short runtime reﬂection (RR) is an architecture pattern for the development of reliable
systems. Themain idea is that amonitoring layer is enrichedwith a diagnosis layer and a subsequentmitigation layer. We only
show the pattern with respect to information ﬂow in a conceptual manner and refer to [7] for a full presentation especially
presenting a realization for a distributed system.
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Application
Logging
Diagnosis
Monitoring
Mitigation
Fig. 1. An application and the layers of the runtime reﬂection framework.
The architecture consists of four layers as shown in Fig. 1, whose role will be sketched in the subsequent paragraphs.
Logging—recording of system events. The role of the logging layer is to observe system events and to provide them in
a suitable format for the monitoring layer. Typically, the logging layer is realized by adding code annotations within the
system to build. However, separated stand-alone loggers, logging for example network trafﬁc, can realize this layer as well.
While the goal of a logger is to provide information on the current run to a monitor, it may not assume (much) on the
properties to be monitored.
Monitoring—fault detection. The monitoring layer consists of a number of monitors (complying to the logger interface of
the logging layer) which observe the stream of system events provided by the logging layer. Its task is to detect the presence
of faults in the system without actually affecting its behavior. In runtime reﬂection, it is assumed to be implemented using
runtime veriﬁcation techniques. If a violation of a correctness property is detected in some part of the system, the generated
monitors will respond with an alarm signal for subsequent diagnosis.
Diagnosis—failure identiﬁcation. Following FDIR, we separate the detections of faults from the identiﬁcation of failures. The
diagnosis layer collects the verdicts of the distributed monitors and deduces an explanation for the current system state. For
this purpose, the diagnosis layer may infer a (minimal) set of system components, which must be assumed faulty in order
to explain the currently observed system state. The procedure is solely based upon the results of the monitors and general
information on the system. Thus, the diagnostic layer is not directly communicating with the application.
Mitigation—reconﬁguration. The results of the system’s diagnosis are then used in order to reconﬁgure the system to
mitigate the failure, if possible. However, depending on the diagnosis and the occurred failure, it may not always be possible
to re-establish a determined system behavior. Hence, in some situations, e. g., occurrence of fatal errors, a recovery system
may merely be able to store detailed diagnosis information for off-line treatment.
5.2.3. Monitor-oriented programming
Monitoring-oriented programming (MOP) [18], proposed by Feng and Rosu, is a software development methodology, in
which the developer speciﬁes desired properties using a variety of (freely deﬁnable) speciﬁcation formalisms, along with
code to execute when properties are violated or validated. The MOP framework automatically generates monitors from the
speciﬁed properties and then integrates them together with the user-deﬁned code into the original system. Thus, it extends
ideas from runtime veriﬁcation by means for reacting on detected violations (or validations) of properties to check. This
allows the development of reﬂective software systems: A software system can monitor its own execution such that the
subsequent execution is inﬂuenced by the code a monitor is executing in reaction to its observations–again inﬂuencing the
observed behavior and consequently the behavior of the monitor itself.
5.2.4. MOP versus RR
RR differs from monitor-oriented programming in two dimensions. First, MOP aims at a programming methodology,
while RR should be understood as an architecture pattern. This implies that MOP support has to be tight to a programming
language, for example Java resulting in jMOP, while in RR, a program’s structure should highlight that it follows the RR
pattern. The second difference of RR in comparison to MOP is that RR introduces a diagnosis layer not found in MOP.2
6. Runtime veriﬁcation and contract enforcement
The notion of contracts is getting popular in computer science. For example, there is contract oriented programming [48]
which has its origin in Hoare’s pre- and post-conditions [40] or contracts describing the behavior of web services and their
2 Clearly, in the MOP framework, a diagnosis can be carried out in the code triggered by a monitor. This yields a program using the MOP methodology
and following the RR pattern.
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composition [2,3,17]. Also, the operations of an organization conforming to a body of regulations could be stated bymeans of
contracts to be used for later compliance checking [4,15,33]. Actually, further examples and how to deal with them formally
are given within this current special issue in the various articles. For the discussion to come, we follow the deﬁnition given
in [54].
Deﬁnition (Contract [54]). A contract is a document which engages several parties in a transaction and stipulates their
obligations, rights, and prohibitions, as well as penalties in case of contract violation.
It is important to understand this deﬁnition in detail. Reading the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition, we see, in simple words, that
a contract deﬁnes a mixture of the expected and possible behavior of the involved parties. The last part of this deﬁnition,
however, caters also for violations to contracted behavior. More speciﬁcally, if the behavior violates the contract, a penalty
is due. Then, however, paying the penalty can be understood as a behavior according to the contract. Clearly, we should
distinguish such behavior from situations in which one party does neither follow the expected behavior nor does pay an a
priory agreed penalty. In that case, we say that one party breaks the contract.
Contract enforcement is the problem of monitoring contract fulﬁllment as well as enforcing the penalty, when a contract
violation has been observed. Following the discussion above, we deﬁne monitoring contract breakage as the problem of
checking whether the contract is fulﬁlled or whether, in case of contract violation, the necessary penalty is paid.
In [54], a formal language CL for contracts is introducedwhich allows to specify obligations, permissions, and prohibitions
over actions. Then, a trace semantics for CL is established and used in conjunction with runtime veriﬁcation techniques to
generate ﬁnite-state monitoring procedures for such contracts [44].
Likewise, in [27], checking for contract breakage is studied in the setting of regulatory conformance. To cater for the
domain speciﬁc way of formulating conformance, linear temporal logic is extended to distinguish between obligations and
permissions, and to allow statements to refer to others. Moreover, a synthesis algorithm yielding efﬁcient monitors for the
resulting language is introduced.
For contract enforcement, we are not aware of any architectural approach. However, contract enforcement apparently
matches runtime reﬂection: Monitoring contract fulﬁllment provides suitable properties to verify at runtime. In case of a
contract violation, the enforcement of penalties asks for mitigation. However, a detailed study in this direction has to be
done.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the gist of runtime veriﬁcation. We have identiﬁed that runtime veriﬁcation deals with
veriﬁcation techniques that allow checking whether an execution of a system under scrutiny satisﬁes or violates a given
correctness property. Moreover, we have learned that runtime veriﬁcation has its roots in model checking and that one of
its main technical challenges is the synthesis of efﬁcient monitors from logical speciﬁcations.
In a certain sense, runtime veriﬁcation is an old story: monitoring, software-fault analysis, runtime checking, runtime
veriﬁcation, diagnosis—they all aimed and aim at extracting an execution trace to be analyzed. The name changed with
the technology shifts in computer science—but the general idea prevailed and proved to be successful. Currently, the focus
on dependable and embedded systems together with the background provided by progress in the broader ﬁeld of formal
methods, especially model checking, are fertilizing the development of runtime veriﬁcation techniques and propel their
application into industry.
Moreover, the emerging paradigms of service oriented architectures, adaptive and self-healing systems, and the use
of electronic contracts ask for monitoring executions of the respective systems/contracts and subsequent reaction in case
of misbehavior, as these systems hard to analyze statically due to their dynamic nature. Especially for these applications,
runtime veriﬁcation techniques form a powerful basis.
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